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Available online 28 October 2016There is general agreement among public health practitioners, academics, and policymakers that people offered
health screening tests should be able to make informed choices about whether to accept. Robust measures are
necessary in order to gauge the extent to which informed choice is achieved in practice and whether efforts to
improve it have succeeded. This review aims to add to the literature on how to improve methods of measuring
informed choice. We discuss and critique commonly-used approaches and outline possible alternative methods
that might address the issues identiﬁed. We explore the challenges of deﬁning what information should be pro-
vided about screening and hence understood by service users, appraise the use of ‘thresholds’ to deﬁne e.g. pos-
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dichotomous outcome that either does or does not occur. Suggestions for future research include providing great-
er detail on why particular aspects of screening information were considered important, analysing knowledge
and attitude measures at an ordinal or continuous level (avoiding problematic decisions about dichotomising
data in order to set thresholds), and reconceptualising informed choice as amultifactorial set of outcomes, rather
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There is broad consensus in the United Kingdom (UK) that when
people are invited to participate in health screening, they should make
an ‘informed choice’ (Department of Health, 2011; National Screening
Committee, 2013; General Medical Council, 2008). Individuals differ in
how they appraise the balance of potential harms and beneﬁts of
screening, and hence whether they consider it worthwhile. This hasthe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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selves. For example, the National Health Service (NHS) in England in-
forms people that “deciding whether or not to have a screening test is a
personal choice and one which only you can make” (NHS Choices,
2015). To varying degrees this perspective is shared internationally
(Andermann et al., 2008). The longstanding paternalistic view that
screening communications should prioritise high levels of uptake has
thus been superseded by a view that uptake can only be maximised
within the constraints of informed choice. However, despite this con-
sensus, there is a notable lack of agreement, consistency, and clarity
about how informed choice should be deﬁned andmeasured in practice
(House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, 2015; Fox,
2006). The inevitable consequence is that efforts to improve it have
made little progress (Biesecker et al., 2013).
Conceptual and methodological challenges are not necessarily ap-
parent as authors usually have limited space to deﬁne informed choice
and its underlying concepts. Descriptions are typically brief, e.g. “an in-
formed decision is one where all the available information about the health
alternatives is weighed up and used to inform the ﬁnal decision; the
resulting choice should be consistent with the individual's values”
(Bekker et al., 1993). Similarly, “an effective decision is one that is based
on relevant knowledge, consistent with the decision-maker's values and
behaviourally implemented” (O'Connor and O'Brien-Pallas, 1989). Argu-
ably, this gives the impression that informed choice is an uncomplicated
interaction between i) a decision maker's knowledge about the pro-
posed intervention; ii) their evaluation of the intervention with respect
to their core values; and iii) their decision on whether or not to be
screened (Marteau et al., 2001).
There are several ways in which informed choice is operationalised
(see Biesecker et al., 2013 for examples) but this ‘trinity’ is often an in-
strumental aspect: researchers aim to measure screening invitees'
knowledge using multiple-choice items or true/false statements (e.g.
“screening is for women without symptoms;” Hersch et al., 2015). Values
are measured in terms of participants' attitudes towards screening (e.g.
“some people ﬁnd the test a bit unpleasant but it is simple to do and is de-
signed to be done in the privacy of your own home. Howdoes thismake you
feel about screening?: Against screening|Unsure |For screening;” Smith et
al., 2010). Screeningbehaviour can sometimes bedetermined by clinical
records and screening intentions are often used as a proxywhen it is not
possible to measure behaviour directly (although this has well-
recognised limitations; Sheeran, 2002). Thresholds are selected for
each of these dimensions to categorise participants: knowledge may
be labelled ‘good’, ‘adequate’, or ‘satisfactory’ vs. ‘poor’, ‘inadequate’, or
‘unsatisfactory’ and attitudes may be ‘positive’ vs. ‘negative’. Similarly,
screening participation may be described in terms of having had or
not had (or intending vs. not intending to have) the test. Participants
are considered to have made an informed choice if they are categorised
as having ‘adequate’ knowledge and behave in a way that is consistent
with their values (e.g. if they have positive attitudes and undergo
screening). Conversely, they are categorised as having made an unin-
formed choice if they are rated as having ‘inadequate’ knowledge or be-
have in a way that is inconsistent with their values. It should be
acknowledged that informed choice overlaps with several related con-
cepts (discussed below) such as broader umbrella terms like ‘informed
decision-making’ (Sheridan et al., 2004; Briss et al., 2004) andmore spe-
ciﬁc concepts within this (e.g. decisional conﬂict (O'Connor, 1995) and
shared decision-making; Briss et al., 2004). However, the literature on
informed choice contains numerous examples of the previously de-
scribed approach to operationalise informed choice (e.g. Biesecker et
al., 2013; Marteau et al., 2001; Hersch et al., 2015; Smith et al., 2010).
This narrative review draws on key studies in order to critique this
method and suggest possible alternatives. Research on informed choice
in screening is becoming more commonplace internationally and re-
ceiving greater attention from policymakers, particularly in the UK
(House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, 2015). It is
therefore crucial that methodologies are appropriate. We focus onthree major issues. First, we discuss the challenge of deﬁning what in-
formation is important for people when they are offered screening. Sec-
ond, we consider the limitations inherent in setting thresholds for
‘adequate’ knowledge and ‘positive’ attitudes or intentions. Finally, we
comment on the standard tripartite operationalisation of informed
choice, described above. To our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to draw ex-
plicit, speciﬁc attention to these issues collectively and explore them in
detail. We hope that this will contribute to discussions on how to ascer-
tain whether informed choice is being achieved in screening. Our dis-
cussion is oriented around this context but our comments may also be
applicable to other scenarios. For example, the same conceptualisation
of informed choice is sometimes applied in areas such as shared deci-
sion-making and informed consent (e.g. Berger-Höger et al., 2015). Al-
though these will not be the primary focus of this review and we will
not address this literature directly, there are also no ‘gold-standard’
methods of measurement related to these concepts (Right Care Shared
Decision Making Programme, 2012; Gillies et al., 2015).
2. Review
2.1. Deﬁning important screening information and knowledge
The information that invitees might consider about screening partici-
pation includes exceptionally complex and multifaceted risks, beneﬁts,
and practical issues, comprising both conceptual and numerical compo-
nents that are unfamiliar tomost people. Statistics such as positive predic-
tive value and the differences between survival vs. mortality are so
challenging that an appreciable proportion of medical professionals mis-
understand them (Wegwarth and Gigerenzer, 2013; Whiting et al.,
2015). The potentially relevant information is even more complex in a
screening setting that does not aim to identify a single disease but a
range of diseases or risk factors, eachwith a unique set of risks and bene-
ﬁts resulting from detection (e.g. genomic screening; Elias and Annas,
1994). Consequently, an early step in the design of any study on informed
choice is tomake a judgement onwhich elements constitute pertinent in-
formation to those offered screening, in order to decide which aspects of
their knowledge to assess. Generally, researchers aim to complete this
step by attempting to follow recommendations of published guidelines
or the stated preferences for information among (potential) screening
service users. However, both approaches have important limitations.
There are several sets of applicable guidelines; one of the most
prominent in the UK is published by the General Medical Council
(GMC), which states that screening invitees should be provided with
the information that they “want or need about… the potential beneﬁts,
risks and burdens, and the likelihood of success, for each option” (General
Medical Council, 2008). These recommendations are broad in order to
apply to a wide range of medical decision-making contexts, meaning
that they lack speciﬁc suggestions on what invitees should be informed
of when deciding whether to have a screening test. However, it is nota-
ble that the recommendation that communicators “should not make as-
sumptions about the information a patient might want or need” is not
compatible with many organised screening programmes, in which the
entire eligible population typically makes screening decisions after
being provided with identical information materials, without speaking
to health professionals. These guidelines have similarities to another
set published by the International Patient Decision Aid Standards
(IPDAS) Collaboration for improving ‘decision quality’ (Elwyn et al.,
2006). These also include standards relating towhat information should
be conveyed to people being asked to make a healthcare decision, al-
though in some respects these are more detailed (e.g. “use event rates
specifying the population and time period”). Previous studies of informed
choice have been guidedbyboth sets of recommendations (e.g.Marteau
et al., 2001; Smith et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2009; Michie et al., 2002;
Kellar et al., 2008).
We consider it debateable whether there is a clear reason to favour
any particular set of guidelines. Ostensibly, they offer the beneﬁt of
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the evidence base” (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence,
2012). However, guidelines are not only based on the available scientiﬁc
evidence, but also the cultural and personal values of the experts and
other individuals appraising that evidence (Kelly et al., 2015; Bekker,
2010). Indeed, this is an acknowledged component of the systematic
Delphi process used to design the IPDAS checklist (Elwyn et al., 2006).
This should be considered when attempting to use guidelines as a
gold standard to decide what constitutes important information. To il-
lustrate this, although the IPDAS checklist explicitly recommends that
a decision aid should include information on “detection/treatment that
would never have caused problems if onewas not screened”, the perceived
importance of this is inﬂuenced by the personal values of a given re-
searcher or health service provider. Individuals will differ in terms of
whether they believe this represents information about screening that
is essential, useful for participants to be aware of but not crucial, unnec-
essary, or undesirable since it would cause participants undue burden
and fear (Jepson et al., 2005; Parker et al., 2015a; Parker et al., 2015b).
The most common alternative to guidelines is to deﬁne important
information based on the views of (potential) screening service users.
However, in a survey of older UK adults, the largemajority stated a per-
sonal preference for “all the information currently available” on the risks
and beneﬁts (Waller et al., 2012). The complexity of medical literature
makes this effectively impossible (Elias and Annas, 1994); researchers
have to balance providing ‘full’ information with avoiding overwhelm-
ing invitees. Furthermore, it is problematic to deﬁnewhat ‘full’ informa-
tionwould consist of (seeManson and O'Neill, 2007 for amore in-depth
exploration of these points in the context of informed consent). Mem-
bers of the public also vary in their stated preferences for information:
previous research has found that some advocate either limiting infor-
mation on the risks of screening or omitting it entirely, on the basis
that its inclusion would decrease participation (Woodrow et al.,
2008). Conversely, researchers may believe there is an ethical duty to
offer this information (Independent UK Panel on Breast Cancer
Screening, 2012). These examples highlight how it is often necessary
for researchers to interject their own judgements on whether to design
information that aligns with the preferences of service users or to over-
ride them based on practical or ethical considerations.
The preceding comments have focused on information provision.
However, this alone is insufﬁcient for ‘informed’ choice, which also re-
quires that information is absorbed and internalised in a meaningful
(and, ideally, demonstrable) way. There are also challenges in this re-
spect: there is little apparent agreement regarding the appropriate
level of ‘granularity’ to knowledge about screening. Invitees may be ex-
pected to understand a concept (“screening saves lives from breast can-
cer”) without necessarily being aware of the underlying statistics and
their implications (e.g. “screening saves about 1 life from breast cancer
for every 200 women who are screened;” National Breast Screening
Programme, 2013). Thus, on the basis of expert advice, a previous
study elected not to provide participants with statistics relating to
breast cancer screening (van Agt et al., 2012), whereas other authors
have recommended their inclusion (e.g. Spiegelhalter et al., 2011;
Baum, 2006; Barratt et al., 2005). There has also been some explicit rec-
ognition that knowledge can exist at different ‘levels’. For example,
Reyna (2008) distinguishes between knowledge based on ‘verbatim’
and ‘gist-level’ information and others have assessed knowledge in
both conceptual and numerical terms (e.g. Hersch et al., 2015; Smith
et al., 2010; Mathieu et al., 2007). This was also an important issue in
the design of the revised information leaﬂet for the Breast Screening
Programme in England, in which there were evident tensions between
the views of academics and potential service users. The former group
generally recommended detailed explanations to illustrate applicable
scientiﬁc caveats whereas the latter group found it distracting (Forbes
et al., 2014).
A further challenge is determining what constitutes ‘accurate’
knowledge, which is particularly problematic when there is littleconsensus among academics or clinicians. In the case of breast screen-
ing, the estimated magnitudes of beneﬁts (in terms of reductions in
breast cancer mortality) and harms (in terms of overdiagnosis) are
highly variable (Paci et al., 2014; Gøtzsche and Nielsen, 2013), with
the extensive epidemiological literature increasing rather than reducing
uncertainty (Independent UK Panel on Breast Cancer Screening, 2012).
In such “contested terrain”, researchers measuring informed choice
must decide which responses will be characterised as correct or incor-
rect. They also have to consider the extent to which they inform partic-
ipants about any lack of consensus. These decisions will almost always
be open to challenge (Sasieni et al., 2015).
The lack of clearly superior guidelines, methods of accounting for
public stated preferences, objectively appropriate levels of granularity
to knowledge, and unambiguous evidence deﬁning ‘accurate’ knowl-
edge is reﬂected in review ﬁndings. There is a striking lack of consisten-
cy among studies that aim to improve informed choice in terms of what
information was provided to participants and how much detail was
given (Biesecker et al., 2013). There is similar inconsistency regarding
which aspects of knowledge aremeasured (Mullen et al., 2006). In sum-
mary, the complexity of screening gives rise to i) an inherently value-
based and ideological component to determining whether knowledge
of a given piece of screening informationmight be considered important
for informed choice; ii) numerous possible ‘levels’ at which screening
information might be retained as knowledge; and iii) varying degrees
of empirical uncertainty regarding what would constitute ‘accurate’
knowledge. However, we believe that there are alternative approaches
that would mitigate these issues considerably.
2.2. Thresholds for dichotomising measures
The two most common methodological approaches for setting
thresholds for ‘adequate’ (or ‘good’) knowledge are to either use a stan-
dard based on observed data (e.g. a median split; Marteau et al., 2001;
Kellar et al., 2008) or predetermined value such as a scale midpoint
(e.g. Smith et al., 2010; Michie et al., 2002; Mathieu et al., 2007). Less
commonly used approaches include multifactorial coding schemes
(e.g. correctly answering 50% of items, including one numerical item
on three knowledge subscales; Hersch et al., 2015).
First, it is difﬁcult to justify deﬁning ‘adequate’ or ‘good’ knowledge
using post-hoc thresholds based on observed data, since descriptions
like ‘adequate’ imply an absolute standard, whereas the location of
(e.g.) a median is relative to the observed data (Marteau et al., 2001).
Second, to our knowledge, there are no robust criteria by which ‘ade-
quate’ knowledge could reasonably be inferred from a speciﬁc number
of items answered correctly. As with the issues around deﬁning ‘impor-
tant’ information, decisions aroundwhere and how to set thresholds are
inherently subjective.
These limitations are not speciﬁc to informed choice (Altman and
Royston, 2006) but they are more prominent since they are often a for-
mal part of how it is operationalised. Variability in thresholds and lack of
validation has previously been documented in this context (Biesecker et
al., 2013; Ames et al., 2015), and the problem is illustrated clearly by van
Agt et al. (2012): a sensitivity analysis in which the threshold for ‘sufﬁ-
cient’ knowledge was varied between 8 and 13 out of 13 knowledge
items answered correctly found that the proportion of participants
categorised as havingmade an informed choice ranged from19% to 88%.
Related to the challenges outlined previously, these issues are exac-
erbated since knowledge items are not perceived as either strictly ‘im-
portant’ or ‘not important’ but rather important to varying degrees.
Although it is analytically convenient to give equal weighting to each
item, this is unlikely to be a reﬂection of the perceptions of any given
reader of a study (or participant). For example, those who consider
overdiagnosis to be the main harm of screening are unlikely to assign
equal importance to items that measure understanding of this concept
compared with itemsmeasuring understanding of false positive results.
This is not taken into account when the same score is applied to all
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sures of attitudes and intentions in that thresholds are often deﬁned for
e.g. ‘positive’ attitudes using the same problematic approaches, which
also overlook differences in the relative importance of items.
On one level, these issues appear to bewell known: in 2001,Marteau
and colleagues noted that “the terms good and poor imply an absolute
standard against which knowledge is judged. It is intended that such a stan-
dard is developed in future” (Marteau et al., 2001). However, in 2015,
Hersch et al. state that “no consensus exists on what level of knowledge
constitutes being informed” (Hersch et al., 2015). Similarly, Ames et al.
conclude that “particular attention ought to be directed towards address-
ing how ‘good’ knowledge and informed choice are deﬁned and measured
from the outset of a screening programme” (Ames et al., 2015). Unfortu-
nately, it appears that there has been little progress in the past
15 years. Aswith the difﬁculties in determiningwhat knowledge should
be considered relevant to people offered screening, we are not con-
vinced that it is realistic to aim for either an empirically-derived stan-
dard of ‘adequate’ knowledge (or ‘positive’ attitudes and intentions),
or a standard based on expert opinion that could not be legitimately
disregarded by researchers with a different perspective. As above, we
believe that there are alternative approaches that would lessen these is-
sues considerably.
2.3. Standard operationalisations of informed choice
As Jepson et al. note, it is open to debate whether informed choice
can be deﬁned andmeasuredmeaningfully, although this is a necessary
assumption of research into the concept (Jepson et al., 2005). We agree
that this assumption is not self-evidently true and we believe there are
some clear parallels between informed choice and cultural constructs
that are rarely thought of as measurable. For example, two individuals
could discuss a notion like ‘justice’ in much the same way as informed
choice, given that there is a clear public interest in ensuring justice in
criminal trials. Hence, they might construct a seemingly plausible and
coherent deﬁnition as the basis of a measure (e.g. “a just outcome is
one where the jury weighs up all the necessary evidence and uses it to in-
form the ﬁnal verdict; sentencing of a defendant found guilty should be con-
sistent with society's values”; adapted from Bekker et al., 1993). The next
step would be to operationalise it in order to categorise a given verdict
as ‘just’ or ‘unjust’. The multiplicity of competing viewpoints of what
constitutes important evidence would have to be addressed, as would
the challenges of determining whether the jury's knowledge of the ev-
idence (comparable to knowledge of screening information) was ‘ade-
quate’ or ‘good’, and quantifying society's values in terms of favouring
punishments that are ‘severe’ vs. ‘lenient’ for a given crime (analogous
to positive vs. negative attitudes).
In this analogy, we believe that informed choice resembles justice
very closely. Despite the desirability of a measure, both concepts are ex-
tremely abstract, value-laden, and open to multiple interpretations, so
operationalisations in which they are treated as a single entity are difﬁ-
cult to support, especially those in which informed choice (or justice) is
deﬁned as a discrete event that either occurs or does not, detached from
the sociocultural context. Hence, we do not take for granted that in-
formed choice is an observable, empirical phenomenon rather than a
more complex philosophical idea. Indeed, as far aswe are aware, the ex-
tensive psychological research on the topic of justice itself has focused
on measuring different levels of perceived justice across various dimen-
sions (e.g. ‘procedural’ and ‘interpersonal’ justice), rather than
attempting to deﬁne and measure it based on an objective standard
(Colquitt et al., 2001).
2.4. Future directions
Per our own collective values,we believe that informed choice ought
to be an integral aspect of screening policy in the UK and internationally
but we also believe there should be a reappraisal of the underlyingconcepts andmethods onwhich studies rely. In this section, we explore
alternative approaches that we hope might overcome the previously
discussed issues. We do not discuss relevant standards of methodologi-
cal quality (e.g. conﬁrming reliability and validity) as they apply inde-
pendently of our suggested approaches.
First, in order to mitigate difﬁculties in deﬁning what constitutes
‘important’ information, we recommend following the example of
some authors (e.g. Hersch et al., 2015; Kellar et al., 2008; van Agt et
al., 2012; de Haan et al., 2013), who report results of individual items
that measure knowledge, rather than only aggregate measures of the
overall number of items answered correctly. This offers greater trans-
parency and allows a reader to interpret results based on their personal
view of the importance of speciﬁc aspects of screening knowledge. It
will often be useful to sum the number of correct responses to create
an overall score. However, we suggest that this should generally be
given a lower priority and only reported in addition to the results of in-
dividual items (and never instead of them). A similar rationale may
apply to reporting of measures of attitudes.
Given that selecting aspects of information to provide and aspects of
knowledge to assess requires researchers to draw from their own
values, we also suggest they are as explicit as possible aboutwhy select-
ed topics were considered important. For example, if researchers select
items based on particular guidelines, it is worth clarifying the rationale
for using that set and the process used to map speciﬁc recommenda-
tions on to knowledge items. Similarly, it would be informative to ex-
plain how items were selected based on input from (prospective)
screening participants, if applicable. Researchers could also clarify
whether any perceived practical or ethical considerations meant the
ﬁnal set of knowledge items did not fully reﬂect guidelines or services
users' stated preferences, and highlight limitations of the selected ap-
proach (e.g. whether conceptual rather than numerical understanding
of particular information was measured). Finally, research evidence
used to determine ‘correct’ responses to knowledge items should be
cited clearly (e.g. Hersch et al., 2013). Thesemeasures will allow a read-
er to gain a fuller understanding of the process underpinning the study
design, even if they do not agree with it.
We have also argued that dichotomisingmeasures of knowledge, at-
titudes, and intentions is difﬁcult to justify on empirical or theoretical
grounds. Subjective and arbitrary thresholds may be addressed by tak-
ing into account the natural properties of the data (for example, that
the number of correctly answered knowledge items is continuous).
Analyses that reﬂect this are likely to bemore robust andwould also ad-
dress the additional problem that information is lost when data are
dichotomised (Altman and Royston, 2006). It may also allow more nu-
anced and informative statistical approaches. For example, regression
analyses could test whether higher knowledge scores are associated
with more or less positive attitude scores, whether more positive atti-
tude scores are positively associated with screening participation
(Marteau et al., 2001), and possibly whether knowledge or attitude
has a stronger association with participation. It would also allow hypo-
thetical moderation effects to be tested: more positive attitude scores
may be associated with a greater probability of screening participation
but this association may be smaller among participants with more
knowledge of harms. This could be extended with respect to our ﬁrst
suggestion of reporting individual items: moderation effects could be
relevant where researchers believe that a single, speciﬁc aspect of
knowledge has particular ethical or empirical signiﬁcance (e.g. overdi-
agnosis in breast cancer screening; Hersch et al., 2015).
Furthermore, although we have focused on a particularly common
method of measuring informed choice, there are other factors that
may be considered relevant and are not encapsulated by knowledge,
values, and behaviour (Biesecker et al., 2013). In their 2006 review,
Mullen et al. (2006) use a broader conceptualisation of ‘informed deci-
sion-making’ rather than informed choice, which they deﬁned in
terms of people's understanding of the nature of a disease and the
healthcare service available (i.e. risks, beneﬁts, alternatives, and
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their values, and engagement in decision-making at a level they ﬁnd
personally desirable (Sheridan et al., 2004; Briss et al., 2004). This
mapped on to amore diverse range ofmeasures in the context of cancer
screening, including decisional self-efﬁcacy, role preference, and deci-
sional conﬂict. There may also be additional topics of interest within
each of these. To take the latter example, the Decisional Conﬂict Scale
is a widely used, validated measure that comprises three subscales
with the aim of assessing the “state of uncertainty about the course of ac-
tion to take” (O'Connor, 1995): decision uncertainty, perceived effective
decision-making, and factors contributing to uncertainty. In addition,
each subscale contains items that relate to further issues that may be
considered important. For example, one item measures the extent to
which an offer of screening is free from coercion (“I feel pressure from
others in making this decision”). Thesemight be used in addition to or in-
stead of standard components of informed choice. Mullen et al. (2006)
highlight a shortcoming of studies prior to 2006 that a conceptual
framework for informed decision-makingwas often lacking; they advo-
cate the use of frameworks and theory as onemethod of mitigating het-
erogeneity in variables measured. In some respects, the
operationalisation that we have addressed is consistent with this rec-
ommendation and so represents an improvement over pre-existing
measures (often of knowledge alone). However, we believe that it
would be more useful for screening policy if it were broadened at least
as far as incorporating outcomes relating to informed decision-making.
We also suggest that research could be improved if the three compo-
nents of informed choice were evaluated individually, rather than
attempting to unify them into a single overall ‘construct’. A more
wide-ranging and less reductive conception of informed choice might
also lead researchers to consider novel hypotheses. For example, since
screening invitees are generally asked to consider information in the
context of complicated social and cultural dynamics between them-
selves and a healthcare provider (Manson and O'Neill, 2007), studies
might assess the association between the level of trust in those offering
screening and uptake of the test (Entwistle et al., 2008). Studies might
also assess how long knowledge is retained, since this relates to how
long it remains valid to assess recall after a choice is made, andwhether
there are any ‘side-effects’ of encouraging an informed choice (e.g.
greater fear of overdiagnosis or false positives). Table 1 contains a sum-
mary of our suggestions.
The following example illustrates some practical ways in which
these methods might beneﬁt policymakers and healthcare providers:
a healthcare provider might commission a randomised controlled trial
to compare a new information leaﬂet that aims to better inform invitees
about the risk of overdiagnosis in breast screening (cf Forbes et al.,Table 1
Suggested future directions for research.
• Report data on knowledge in terms of how participants respond to items on
individual topics; place less emphasis on aggregated data (e.g. the number of
items answered correctly)
• Detail explicit reasons why information topics were selected e.g. why particu-
lar guidelines or types of service user input were used and not others, how
selection was affected by practical constraints or researchers' values
• Refer to the evidence underpinning how responses to knowledge items were
classiﬁed as correct or incorrect
• Analyse ordinal and continuous data without setting problematic thresholds
for dichotomisation
• Analyse data using more informative statistical methods (such as regression,
allowing e.g. moderation effects to be tested)
• Consider dimensions relevant to informed choice beyond knowledge, values,
and behaviour e.g. aspects of decisional conﬂict
• Report data on knowledge, values, and behaviour (and behavioural inten-
tions) separately, without aggregating them into a single, overall variable
labelled ‘informed choice’
• Consider hypotheses that would be unfeasible to test using existing
conceptualisations of informed choice (e.g. whether knowledge of screening
predicts uptake)2014) with the current leaﬂet (i.e. “usual care”). Measures might in-
clude knowledge of various aspects of screening (e.g. overdiagnosis
and potential health beneﬁts), attitudes towards screening, and uptake.
Results that follow from our suggestions might indicate that relative to
the control arm, the intervention demonstrates: i) superior knowledge
of overdiagnosis and comparable knowledge of other aspects of screen-
ing; ii) more negative attitudes towards screening; iii) comparable up-
take. This would reassure policymakers that the leaﬂet improves
knowledge of overdiagnosis, without adversely affecting population
health outcomes via reduced uptake (all else being equal). However,
themore negative attitudes towards screeningmay represent a concern
that should be addressed. This relatively rich evaluation of the effects of
an intervention contrastswith the samehypothetical study inwhich the
primary outcome is a dichotomous measure of informed choice. In this
case, the greater proportion of participantswith knowledge of overdiag-
nosis, speciﬁcally, might not be reﬂected in a greater proportion of peo-
ple with a level of knowledge over an arbitrary threshold. Furthermore,
themore negative attitudes towards screening and comparable levels of
uptake might imply that fewer people are making an informed choice,
and obscure the possibilities that attitudes are not strongly associated
with screening behaviour (a hypothesis that could be tested in the
ﬁrst example). Some previous studies have used or advocated certain
aspects of the ﬁrst approach (e.g. Marteau et al., 2001; Hersch et al.,
2015; Smith et al., 2010) andwe believe this showshow amore detailed
appraisal would more meaningfully inform policymakers and
healthcare providers than a reductionist approach.
In closing, we acknowledge that following our suggestions would
have some limitations. First, reportingmore outcomesmay raise poten-
tial statistical issues around testing multiple hypotheses but we would
argue that these are well-recognised and relatively straightforward to
address in comparison to the more problematic conceptual issues that
we believe would likely be resolved. Second, undertakingmore compli-
cated analyses and interpreting a broader range of outcomes may be
more challenging and time-consuming than other methods. We
would counter that they are likely to be more useful to policymakers
and healthcare providers in the long-term if they offer more validity.
However, a potential threat to this usefulness is if there is signiﬁcant di-
vergence between researchers' conceptions of (e.g.) the information
they believe to be important and the views of service users and
policymakers. This may lead to study results being irrelevant or impos-
sible to compare. However, we are not suggesting an entirely individu-
alistic approach to deﬁning important topics but one in which service
users, healthcare providers, policymakers, academics, and other stake-
holders continue to shape the views of one another, which is likely to
minimise disagreement. We would also argue that the methods we
have suggested are not creating issues themselves but rather adding
transparency around issues that are inherent in the topic.
We have focused on quantitative methods of studying informed
choice because we believe there are signiﬁcant beneﬁts to generating
information that is readily interpretable and actionable. Although we
hope that quantitative approaches can still be justiﬁed, one might ex-
tend our arguments to the conclusion that informed choice is ultimately
too subjective to be amenable to this approach. Thismight imply that an
even more abstract conceptualisation may be warranted. For example,
policymakers may promote the value of informed choice as a cultural
norm among practitioners, the effects of which might suit qualitative
methods of assessment. We offer our suggestions as a contribution to
future discussions for improving the measurement of informed choice.
3. Conclusion
We have discussed some important limitations of commonly used
approaches to measuring informed choice, which suffer from a lack of
agreed standards regarding which aspects of knowledge are important,
subjective or inappropriately deﬁned thresholds for dichotomising key
components, and an overly reductive conceptualisation. We suggest
606 A. Ghanouni et al. / Preventive Medicine Reports 4 (2016) 601–607some alternative approaches that may be more appropriate. Instead of
attempting to deﬁne informed choice as either occurring or not occur-
ring, we suggest reporting detailed results using individual items, ex-
plicit descriptions of how information and items were selected,
avoiding the use of thresholds, greater use of regression methods to ex-
plore associations between components, and more wide-ranging rele-
vant measures. We hope our suggestions will foster discussions on
how informed choice research can be developed, as this will allow
more valid auditing of the extent to which informed choice is achieved
in practice, and lend greater weight to comparisons of interventions
that aim to improve screening.
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